THE SEQUENCING OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

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Conventional accounts of protest cycles posit a demonstration effect—successful protests incite other constituencies to activism. I offer an alternative theory that builds on population ecology models of organizational behavior. I argue that the expansion of social movement organizations, or organizational density, is also an essential component of protest cycles. Multivariate analyses of the effects of civil rights protest and organizational growth on feminist protest and organizational foundings between 1955 and 1985 demonstrate that organizational density promotes the diffusion of protest. Protest also engenders activism by others, but only under favorable political conditions. This implies that an enduring organizational niche and political allies in power are necessary for protest to spread beyond single movements and create protest opportunities for other challengers.

In the 1960s and early 1970s, the politics and culture of collective action in the United States experienced dramatic shifts. Groups historically shut out of the political arena gained access to an extent previously unknown (Oberschall 1978; Zald 1988). The received wisdom—both popular and academic—is that the U.S. civil rights movement was critical in shaping the trajectories of other movements for social change because it initiated a widespread “cycle of protest” (Tarrow 1991, 1994) that created opportunities for activism by other constituencies, such as women, progressive students, and lesbians and gay men (McAdam 1995). Although this is an empirically plausible interpretation of events, there have been no systematic efforts to model this relationship or to test the validity of general arguments regarding the structure of protest cycles.¹

I examine the dominant model of protest cycles developed by Tarrow (1991, 1994) to provide a more precise specification that builds on organizational models of social movement development (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Minkoff 1994, 1995). I argue that protest cycles are the visible manifestation of the interaction between organizational trajectories and protest-event trajectories. In contrast, Tarrow’s perspective emphasizes the generative role of a protest dynamic without adequately considering the role of organizational dynamics. To subsume both protest processes and organizational processes under the singular rubric of “protest cycles” masks the underlying causal dynamic.² Tarrow (1991, 1994) ar-

¹ Koopmans (1993) may be an exception, although his analysis is essentially descriptive and aggregates protest across a range of groups without considering intermovement influences.

² Following Tarrow (1994), a cycle of protest is “a phase of heightened collective conflict and contention across the social system that includes: a rapid diffusion of collective action from more mobilized to less mobilized sectors; a quickened pace of innovation in the forms of contention; new or transformed collective action frames; a combination of organized and unorganized participation; and sequences of intensified interac-

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argues that a “demonstration effect” is associated with successful or effective collective action: Protest by early risers encourages protest by other participants because early protest signals the potential vulnerability of elites to challenges. Therefore, it is the information provided by successful protest that drives the development of broad-based cycles (Connell and Cohn 1995). In contrast to Tarrow, I argue that trajectories of protest cycles are jointly determined by increases in the rates of protest and increases in the density of social movement organizations.3

Increases in organizational density accelerate the diffusion of activism across multiple constituencies through a transfer of information and the construction of a niche or resource infrastructure. Just as protest activity broadcasts the effectiveness of these tactics, increases in organizational density demonstrate movement success in sustaining organizations. This demonstration effect emphasizes organizational processes over protest dynamics. Increases in organizational density also promote the expansion of a niche—a resource base—for social movement activity that provides an enduring infrastructure for the diffusion of protest when political conditions are favorable. Interorganizational competition, however, may limit future activism. This alternative model suggests that it is the organizational component of the opportunity structure that is important. Political space is initially opened up by organizational expansion, but later becomes overcrowded and less open to new entrants. Organizational density is thus critical throughout the protest cycle—initially opening opportunities for protest and organization-building, but later closing these opportunities.

I examine contrasting specifications of the protest cycle using an event-history analysis of the influence of civil rights protest and organizational density on feminist protest and organization-building between 1955 and 1985. These two movements are commonly described as “initiator” and “spin-off” movements (McAdam 1995). The data suggest that at the height of a protest cycle a sustained sequencing of social movement development is linked to organizational expansion. Precedent-setting movements like the civil rights movement open up opportunities via organization-building and protest that allow other constituencies to create movements of their own. The dominant conceptualization of protest cycles as predominantly cognitive therefore obscures the important organizational processes undergirding the opportunity for broad-based protest.

THE STRUCTURE OF PROTEST CYCLES

The defining characteristic of a protest cycle is the rapid and widespread diffusion of protest behavior across a wide variety of groups. The basic argument is that changes in political conditions position “early risers” to take advantage of the new opportunities for activism (Tarrow 1991, 1994). If these early risers are successful, a demonstration effect encourages protest by other groups because success signals the vulnerability and responsiveness of elites. Successful protest also broadcasts that certain forms of collective action are viable and that the interests of elites are at risk (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 1996). Movements that arise later are “easy riders,” who effectively take advantage of a political opportunity structure that others struggled to open up” (Tarrow 1991: 84). Accordingly, the information transmitted by successful insurgencies becomes the key indicator of political opportunity for emerging movements and drives the development of
broad-based protest cycles. Prior traditions of organization provide networks of support and diffusion during the movement’s emergent phase (Tarrow 1995), but movement organizations do not directly affect the intermovement diffusion of activism.

At the peak of the protest wave, competition for members and supporters leads social movement organizations (SMOs) to escalate protest. New organizations emerge and conventional interest groups become active in the social movement arena. The creation of new SMOs produces interorganizational competition as groups try to outdo each other by adopting radical forms of action in competition for public support and attention (Meyer 1993, Meyer and Imig 1993). This “competitive spiral” is the dynamic behind the protest wave, encouraging tactical innovation and expanding “the definition of what constitutes a challenge” (Tarrow 1991:54). Increasing radicalization ultimately discourages continued participation by most supporters, although it may also prompt limited concessions from elites as they try to defuse the protest wave.

McAdam (1995) argues that cultural diffusion and adaptation drive protest cycles. Initiator movements, rather than conferring some sort of political leverage, provide a cultural or cognitive signal to others. Initiator movements are the source of new cultural forms—of insurgent consciousness, cognitive liberation, injustice frames—and spinoff movements are the adopters and avenues for broad diffusion. According to McAdam, movement organizations and associational networks are the conduits for cultural diffusion, especially early in the protest cycle when existing ties among activists provide direct points of contact for the spread of movement ideas and political socialization. Most important, activist networks facilitate processes of social construction that encourage the “attribution of similarity” necessary for new constituencies to identify with the initiator movement enough to mimic its efforts (McAdam 1995:233). Direct ties also make other tactical and organizational innovations available to a wider group of potential activists, but the information function is central. Later in the protest cycle, McAdam suggests that the need for direct ties is replaced by the general availability of the new “organizing template,” which explains the widening “ecological scope” (Snow and Benford 1992) characteristic of protest cycles. Network theories do not explain, however, how protest cycles contract or decline.

**Density-Dependent Processes and Protest Cycles**

One way to understand the relationship between organizational processes and the development of protest cycles is suggested by density-dependence theory, a part of population ecology theories of organizational behavior (Hannan and Carroll 1992; Hannan and Freeman 1989). Density-dependence theory specifies a curvilinear relationship between the number of active organizations (density) and organizational founding rates and failure rates (Hannan and Freeman 1989; Hannan and Carroll 1992). A rise in density establishes a favorable environment for group formation by opening up an organizational niche—what Aldrich and Marsden (1988) define as a resource combination sufficient to support an organizational form. High rates of organizational formation and

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4 Note that the protest-cycle model emphasizes successful protest. Presumably, protest that is quickly repressed or gains little publicity signals a less favorable environment for extra-institutional tactics. Conell and Cohn (1995) look at strike behavior in France between 1890 and 1935, positing that strikes stimulate further strikes through consciousness-raising, by defining occasions for action, and by signalling the relative power of authorities and strikers. Successful strikes tend to increase strike rates, but under favorable political conditions workers may discount the information provided by unsuccessful strikes. Conell and Cohn’s analysis emphasizes the diffusion of protest (strikes) across a constituency (workers) that occupies a relatively similar structural position, whereas the interesting aspect of Tarrow’s protest-cycle theory is the diffusion of protest behavior across distinct social groups.

5 “Initiator movements” are what Tarrow (1994) calls “early risers”; “spin-off movements” are “easy riders.” I use each pair of terms interchangeably and introduce the term “later entrants” to refer to movements that develop later in the protest cycle.
survival affect the survival chances of individual organizations that locate within the niche and adopt the dominant model of organization. Survival demonstrates to elites that new forms of organizing are legitimate (Hannan and Freeman 1989; Yuchtman and Seashore 1967). In this way, organizational density promotes and shapes new organizational activity. As a sector becomes established, however, increases in density encourage interorganizational competition for resources, limiting further access to resources and depressing new organizational activity (Hannan and Carroll 1992).

The few studies that relate to social movement and interest organizations indicate that rates of new group formation are tied to the growing density of social and political organizations. For example, Walker (1983) found that the explosion of citizen’s groups in the early 1970s was related to start-up support from existing groups that had already gained ground in the interest-group sector. Minkoff (1995) demonstrated that density-dependence encouraged the founding of national women’s and racial/ethnic organizations, both in the aggregate and across constituency boundaries. For example, civil rights organizational density promoted the founding of Hispanic-American and Asian-American organizations between 1955 and 1985. These findings corroborate Olzak and West’s (1991) results explaining the founding of ethnic newspapers during an earlier historical period. Although a recent study of interest-group populations in six states found no significant relationship between density and lobbying-group entry rates, it noted that the density of interest organizations usually was correlated with high rates of organizational failure or exit from the political scene (Gray and Lowery 1995).

Applying the idea of density-dependence to protest cycles, I suggest that the influence of early risers on subsequent social movements is primarily organizational: The growing density of early-riser organizations encourages other constituencies to form organizations. In turn, opportunities for protest increase because the organizational infrastructure is less vulnerable to changes in political conditions (Minkoff 1994). The so-called demonstration effect has a more tangible form: The survival of precedent-setting organizations and the growing density of SMOs establish a resource and institutional space for protest by the early risers. This organizational infrastructure provides co-optable networks for mobilization (Freeman 1973) and bloc recruitment (Oberschall 1973), supplies activists prepared to organize related efforts (McAdam 1995; Meyer and Whittier 1994), and makes material resources available for organizational startups and ongoing projects (Walker 1983). Increased density also legitimizes participating social movements, bringing in more third-party support (financial and political) and improving their “bargaining positions” (Hannan and Carroll 1992; Minkoff 1994; Yuchtman and Seashore 1967).

Increased organizational density also weakens the protest cycle by increasing interorganizational competition (Koopmans 1993; Tarrow 1991). Having encouraged others to enter the social movement arena, initiator movements may have to compete with more groups for resources, public attention, and political support. New constituencies and their organizations may later replace early risers. Alternatively, initiator movements, as niche-builders, may be protected by established streams of support and greater institutional legitimacy. That is, established groups may have a competitive advantage with respect to resource procurement and survival (Stinchcombe 1965). Rather than a general set of opportunities that increases activism across a variety of constituencies, then, there may be a more discrete, competitive sequencing of social movements.6

6 One criticism of organizational ecology is that it cannot incorporate the insights of political opportunity models that argue that the environment comprises actors whose actions affect organizational formation and protest cycles. This requires an analysis of the actions of actors in the environment rather than an examination of aggregate results of such actions and how they influence subsequent behavior of a movement. Also, the effects of countermovement mobilization and repression may be captured in the observed rate of protest so that these effects are built into the associated demonstration effect. Koopmans (1993) criticizes ecological models on other grounds, suggesting that the “growth of SMOs is more a product than a cause of protest wave” (p. 41). His descriptive time-series data are inadequate to test this claim.
THE SEQUENCING OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT

The prototypical example of intermovement diffusion of protest is the relationship between the U.S. civil rights movement and the contemporary feminist movement: "If there was ever a movement that seemed dependent on gates of opportunity that were opened by others, it was the American women's movement of the 1960s" (Tarrow 1994:180). How did the civil rights movement "open the gates" for the feminist movement? Was the expansion of the cycle related to an information effect based on successful protests, or was it the result of an organizational effect linked to an expanding niche for both protest and organization?

The first stirring of the contemporary women's movement coincided with the most active phase of the civil rights insurgency in the mid-1960s (Ferree and Hess 1985; McAdam 1982). The civil rights movement emerged in the mid-1950s as a result of changes in the political opportunity structure that encouraged the growth of indigenous southern organizations (e.g., the NAACP, Black churches, historically Black colleges and universities) and provided leverage for African Americans in the electoral arena. By the beginning of the 1960s, these trends produced a political consciousness and opened prospects for protest and the formation of new organizations (McAdam 1982; Morris 1984).

Broad macro-demographic, economic, and political trends were also significant for women's mobilization in the following decade—for example, the increase in the labor force participation of White women, changing family patterns, and the growing number of White women and middle-class women with post-secondary degrees (Ferree and Hess 1985; Klein 1984). Klein (1984) emphasizes the growing feminist consciousness among women and their increased electoral potential. Costain (1992) emphasizes the facilitative role of the federal government and shifts in the electoral balance of power that encouraged political parties to compete for women's votes and support reform legislation.

McAdam (1995) also suggests that the general opportunities provided by the cycle of protest initiated earlier by Blacks were important for the emergence of the contemporary women's movement. There is no question that women were operating in a legal and political environment they shared with civil rights groups. Both constituencies were included in key legislation (e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, dealing with employment), and both groups pressured the federal government for legislative solutions to problems of inequality (Burstein 1985).

The sequencing of the civil rights movement and the new feminist movement took a variety of direct and indirect forms. The impetus for much early feminist activism was the sexism experienced by women in the civil rights and student movements of the 1960s (Evans 1979). Their deep frustration with the contradictions between progressive politics and practice led them to organize independently against male-dominated institutions. Feminists from this younger, women's liberation branch of the movement formed smaller, less formal, groups that pursued more radical action, provided resources directly to women, and engaged in consciousness-raising activities (Ferree and Hess 1985; Freeman 1973; Klein 1984).

The older branch of the movement was initiated in 1966 following the Third National Conference of Commissions on the Status of Women. Conference officials would not allow delegates from state commissions to put forward a resolution demanding that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
guarantee that the sex provision of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act be enforced to the same extent as the race provision. A group of women at the conference met and formed the National Organization of Women (NOW): "[S]everal angry women agreed that the time had come to organize a group that could lobby for women in the same way that the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) worked on behalf of blacks" (Ferree and Hess 1985:54).

Costain (1992) documents the rapid development and coalition activities of groups such as NOW, the Women's Equity Action League, and the National Women's Political Caucus, all of which adopted bureaucratic models of organization and pursued moderate goals and tactics.

The civil rights movement was clearly a reference point for the initiation of both strands of the women's movement. The contemporary women's movement also owed much of its resources and institutional access to traditional White women's associations, where many leaders of the older strand gained leadership skills (Evans 1979; Gelb and Paley 1982; Klein 1984; Taylor 1989).

In addition, in the early 1970s traditional White women's groups like the League of Women Voters, the American Association of University Women (AAUW), and the General Federation of Women's Clubs joined with newly formed women's rights groups to promote passage of the Equal Rights Amendment (Gelb and Paley 1982).

Late in the 1970s, the women's movement moved away from local social movement activity and established a dense and diverse field of national organizations (Costain 1992). This national organizational system is made up of mass membership associations like NOW; specialized groups, including litigation and research groups like the Center for Women Policy Studies; single-issue groups like the National Abortion Rights Action League; traditional women's organizations like the AAUW; and an electoral campaign sector comprising political action committees sponsored by large women's organizations, along with campaign-oriented groups like the Women's Campaign Fund (Spalter-Roth and Schreiber 1995). Katzenstein (1990) also shows that women have been mobilizing "unobtrusively" within such male-dominated institutions as the military and the Catholic Church. At the national level, women's movement organizations, many of which were rooted in the protest cycle precipitated by the civil rights movement, currently outnumber civil rights groups and Black organizations (Minkoff 1995).

**RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES**

This brief account of the joint development of the civil rights movement and the feminist movement suggests the significant influence of the protest cycle initiated by the civil rights movement. To what extent can the development of African-American activism be credited with the subsequent increase of women's activism in the late 1960s and early 1970s? Was this a protest effect or an organization effect? Did the growth of the women's movement play a role in the decline of the civil rights movement that originally opened opportunities for it? Figure 1 summarizes the predicted influences across the civil rights and feminist movements.

According to the protest dynamic model, protest by early risers has a positive influence on protest events and organizational formation by others. Black protest events are the key independent variable. Thus, I expect:

**H₁:** Increases in civil rights movement activity promoted protest by feminists and the formation of women's organizations.

The organization dynamic model posits that the growing density of civil rights organizations, not the protest events themselves, promoted women's activism and organizational activity. Increased density also increases interorganizational competition for resources, which limits the amount of new activity that can be supported over the course of the protest cycle. This suggests an alternative hypothesis:

**H₂:** Increases in African-American organizational density promoted increases in feminist activism and organizational activity; later in the cycle, this density effect was reversed as a result of interorganizational competition (i.e., the density function is concave).
The density of African-American organizations is the independent variable in this formulation; feminist protest events and organizational founding rates are the dependent variables.

I also argue that intermovement competition leads to a decline in the protest cycle. The development of the feminist movement may have constrained subsequent Black protest as these later entrants competed with the initiator movements for resources, public attention, and political support. This leads to a third prediction:

H$_{3a}$: Increases in the number of feminist organizations and protest events decreased Black activism as the protest cycle developed.

A competing hypothesis is that civil rights and African-American groups, as initiators, occupied a protected position in the niche. This suggests:

H$_{3b}$: Increases in the number of feminist organizations and protest events had no effect on Black activism or organizational activity over the course of the protest cycle.

METHODS

I model the organizational founding rate and the protest rate using Poisson regression analysis, which is appropriate for yearly count data (Barron 1992; Hannan 1991; Hannan and Freeman 1989; Olzak and Shanahan 1996). The baseline Poisson model takes the form:

$$Pr(Y_i = y_i) = e^{-L_i}L_i^{y_i}/y_i!,$$

where $y_i$ is the number of organizations formed or protest events occurring in year $i$. This is a one-parameter distribution with the mean and variance of $Y_i$ equal to $L_i$. To incorporate exogenous variables $X_{ij}$ ($j = 1,...,K$), including a constant, the parameter $L_i$ is specified to be

$$L_i = \exp(X_iB).$$

The exponential function ensures that the founding rate is a nonnegative integer (Cameron and Trivedi 1986).

In the Poisson formulation, the assumption that the conditional mean and variance of $Y_i$ given $X_i$ are equal fails to account for overdispersion (when the variance exceeds the mean) and can result in a downward bias of the standard errors for coefficients for the exogenous variables (Barron 1992; Cameron and Trivedi 1986; Hannan 1991). A common approach to this problem has been to estimate the event count using negative binomial regression, which is a generalization of the Poisson model. Choice of model is based on standard tests of fit for nested models. In the analyses that follow, I present negative binomial or Poisson estimates, depending on which model fits the data best. The event-
count models are estimated using *Limdep 5.1* (Greene 1988).

**DATA**


Information was collected on 402 national women’s organizations. Women’s organizations are defined as those groups stating that their primary objective is women’s rights or the status of women in U.S. society. Fifty of these were organizations of women of color that emphasize gender issues. Information was also collected on 342 African-American national organizations, including general civil rights organizations as well as groups devoted to improving the status of African Americans in U.S. society. The selected organizations include mainstream advocacy and service organizations like NOW, the NAACP, and the National Urban League, as well as protest and cultural groups organized around more activist agendas like the Black Panthers and Women Make Movies. This broad definition of the two “social movement industries”—all organizations mobilized around preferences for change (McCarthy and Zald 1977)—captures the range of alternatives used by marginalized groups to pursue reform and social change.

The database is limited to membership organizations. It excludes staff-run nonprofit advocacy groups and service agencies, along with government bodies that may promote women’s and civil rights issues. Direct participation of constituents is a distinguishing feature of social movement organizations (Kriesi 1996) and voluntary associations face unique problems of resource acquisition (Knoue 1989). Short-lived and radical groups may be underrepresented in the *Encyclopedia*, but these groups may be visible in the media (which is one source of the directory’s information). Some groups may overstate the institutional challenge they pose to the status quo. However, because the directory is intended as a resource for potential members there are incentives to provide relatively accurate, if somewhat benign, self-descriptions. Despite a tendency for the *Encyclopedia* to list more mainstream groups, the general contours of African-American and women’s social movement and interest organizational populations are adequately represented. Minkoff (1995) describes additional strengths and limits to data from the *Encyclopedia of Associations* for developing event-history and time-series data.

**MEASURES**

*Organizational Foundings*

The year of founding is reported by the organization. Based on this information, I constructed yearly counts of the number of new organizations for each constituency. Organizations for which the founding date was missing are excluded when constructing yearly measures. This includes 18 (5 percent) of the 342 civil rights organizations and 38 (9 percent) of the 402 women’s groups, leading to a slightly higher underestimation of the founding rate for women. Most women’s organizations with missing founding dates enter the database after 1974, but civil rights organizations lacking this information are spread fairly evenly over the 1955–1985 period. Because the formation of women’s groups peaks after 1970, the excluded cases should not make a significant difference in the pattern of results.⁸

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⁸ An alternative to excluding cases with missing data would be to use year of first mention in the *Encyclopedia*. This, however, misspecifies the concept of organizational founding because it assumes that organizations are not active until they are listed in the directory. On average, it can take three years for new organizations to be located and listed in the *Encyclopedia* (Minkoff 1995).
Protest Events

Civil rights movement events are measured as the total number of civil rights and Black movement-initiated events occurring per year as coded from the New York Times Annual Index (Jenkins and Ekert 1986; McAdam 1982). Feminist protest events refer to the total number of pro-feminist-movement initiated events occurring each year, also coded from the New York Times Index (Rosenfeld and Ward 1996). This includes institutionalized insurgency (e.g., campaigns to enact legislation, register voters, petition); boycotts and strikes; mass actions, such as protests, sit-ins, and demonstrations; illegal or violent actions; and women’s politically oriented cultural events. When included as control variables, the measures were lagged one or two years. In the analysis of the women’s movement, protest events were lagged two years; in the civil rights analysis, they were lagged one year. There was a theoretical basis for this decision—early in the cycle it takes time for the demonstration effect to cause discernible increases in subsequent protest events, whereas the effect is more immediate later in the cycle.

Organizational Density

Organizational density is measured separately for women’s organizations and civil rights organizations. Density is calculated as the total number of organizations active at the end of the prior year, plus the number of new entrants, minus the number of groups that exited (either because they failed, became inactive, or did not respond to repeated requests for updated information). Entry into the population is defined as the reported year of founding, or, if such information is missing, when an organization entered the sample between editions of the Encyclopedia. Using year of first mention for missing data on founding is defensible in this case, because no assumptions are made about whether the organization was active prior to entering the sample. The density of feminist organizations may be underestimated before 1974 because most organizations without founding dates entered the database after 1974. A quadratic density term was used to test for the hypothesized curvilinear relationship between organizational density and protest events and organizational foundings. The squared density terms are divided by 100 to reduce the number of places after the decimal point in reported coefficients. Density is lagged two years, except when modeling the effect of the density of women’s organizations on civil rights protests in which case it is lagged one year to capture a more proximate effect.

Control Variables

Control variables provide a baseline model from which to observe the influence of lagged measures of organizational density and number of protest events. These measures are derived from accounts of the emergence of the civil rights movement and the contemporary women’s movement (Burstein 1985; Costain 1992; Klein 1984; McAdam 1982; Rosenfeld and Ward 1991, 1996).

When analyzing the women’s movement, I control for the female labor force participation rate (lagged one year) (Economic Report of the President 1989:table B-36) and for public opinion favoring women’s rights, which was measured as the percentage of adults indicating they would vote for a
woman for President of the United States (lagged one year) (Neimi, Mueller, and Smith 1989). I also include a measure of movement success—the percentage of Congressional bill introductions advancing women’s status passed by Congress between 1955 and 1985 (Costain 1992). These measures are predicted to have a positive influence on number of feminist protest events and new organizational activity.

I also include two general measures of the political and social environment. As a measure of political opportunities, I include a variable referencing Democratic Party advantage in Congress, measured by the number of Democrats elected to the House of Representatives minus the number of Republicans elected (lagged one year) (Congressional Quarterly 1993). This variable measures the presence of influential allies, who form a key component of the political opportunity structure (Tarrow 1996; McAdam 1982 and Costain 1992) both suggest such political leverage facilitated the passage of laws favorable to women and Blacks, promoting opportunities for activism. For example, federal legislation and programs associated with President Kennedy’s War on Poverty and Johnson’s Great Society served a symbolic function by indicating a favorable environment, lowered costs of action, and so on that fostered subsequent collective action (Burstein 1985; Costain 1992; Jenkins and Ekert 1986; McAdam 1982; Walker 1983). 11

To measure the availability of funding, I use a one-year lagged measure of total foundation and corporate funding for public interest organizations (in billions, 1982 constant dollars) (American Association of Fund-Raising Council 1988). As the protest cycle waned in the 1970s and into the 1980s, foundation sponsorship of organizations and programs serving women and minorities grew as part of a general funding trend associated with dramatic increases in SMOs and advocacy organizations (Jenkins 1985, 1987; Walker 1983).

When modeling the development of the civil rights movement, I include the same measures of the political/resource environment, along with group-specific variables (McAdam 1982; Burstein 1985); African-American labor force participation (lagged one year) (Economic Report of the President 1989, table B-36); the percentage of adults willing to vote for an African American for President (lagged one year) (Neimi et al. 1989); and the number of Blacks in Congress, which can be considered a measure of movement success (lagged two years) (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1978:154; U.S. Department of Commerce 1989:244). These measures are expected to have a direct positive effect on the number of civil rights protests.

RESULTS

Figure 2 depicts the expansion of the women’s movement since 1955. Between 1968 and 1973, the number of feminist organizations founded is inversely related to the number of women’s protest events. However, foundings and protest events moved in tandem through the rest of the decade, with foundings leading protest events by a year or two. A final spike in protest events appears around 1982 as new organizational activity continued to decline. This increase in protest events reflects the final efforts of women’s groups to secure ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment in spite of newly elected President Reagan’s antipathy (Costain 1992).

Figure 3 compares the trajectories of the civil rights movement and the feminist movement after 1955. There is an obvious sequencing of these two major U.S. social movements. African-American protest events predate and dwarf feminist protest events and

10 The information was originally coded using U.S. Statutes at Large and the Congressional Record (Costain 1992:xviii). I also examined the influence of bill introductions relating to women’s issues, but this variable was not a significant predictor of either women’s organizational foundings or protest events.

11 Tarrow (1991) describes this dynamic: “Within the American cycle of protest, policy innovations directed at one group could give rise both to new channels of access and to generalized expectations about elite responsiveness among others, leading to new stages of protest which in turn evoked new policy responses. This seems to have been the relationship between the Black movement and other movements for minority rights which followed similar strategies and succeeded—at a much lower cost—in achieving many of the gains that blacks had fought for in the 1960s” (p. 96).
organizational foundings. Feminist protest events and foundings are low until about 1965, when Black protests peak. As competition between Black organizations initiated the decline of Black activism, feminist collective action took off. Nonetheless, a significant overlap in African-American and women's organization and mobilization remains after 1968. Clearly, the women's movement developed in the context of a stable population of national African-American organizations.

The Intermovement Diffusion of Activism

According to the protest dynamic model, increases in civil rights movement events should promote protest and organizational formation by feminists. The organization dynamic model predicts that the growing den-

Figure 3. Characteristics of the Civil Rights Movement and the Feminist Social Movement Compared, 1955 to 1985
### Table 1. Poisson Coefficients from the Regression of the Number of Feminist Protest Events on Selected Independent Variables: United States, 1955 to 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female labor force participation (t−1)</td>
<td>.231*** (.042)</td>
<td>.457*** (.070)</td>
<td>.086 (.044)</td>
<td>.323*** (.080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent vote for woman President (t−1)</td>
<td>.100*** (.022)</td>
<td>.068** (.022)</td>
<td>−.034 (.025)</td>
<td>−.045 (.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party advantage in Congress (t−1)</td>
<td>−.006* (.002)</td>
<td>−.005 (.003)</td>
<td>−.003 (.002)</td>
<td>−.006 (.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation funding (t−1)</td>
<td>.259 (.341)</td>
<td>.666* (.332)</td>
<td>−.454 (.375)</td>
<td>.099 (.388)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent laws passed favoring women</td>
<td>.048 (.106)</td>
<td>−.203 (.118)</td>
<td>−.311* (.130)</td>
<td>−.387** (.126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of feminist protest events (t−1)</td>
<td>.173e−2*** (.029e−2)</td>
<td>.220e−2*** (.032e−2)</td>
<td>.078e−2* (.032e−2)</td>
<td>.148e−2*** (.038e−2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density of feminist organizations (t−2)</td>
<td>−.020*** (.004)</td>
<td>−.042*** (.006)</td>
<td>−.008* (.004)</td>
<td>−.029*** (.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Black protest events (t−2)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>−.013*** (.004)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>−.014** (.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black protest events × Democratic Party advantage</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.005e−2 (.003e−2)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.006e−2* (.003e−2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density of Black organizations (t−2)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.039*** (.007)</td>
<td>.030*** (.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−9.125*** (1.776)</td>
<td>−9.812*** (1.634)</td>
<td>−1.443 (1.599)</td>
<td>−2.628 (2.067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>−74.9</td>
<td>−6.2</td>
<td>−61.9</td>
<td>−52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; “e−2” indicates that the regression coefficient or standard error should be multiplied times 10−2.

* p < .05  ** p < .01  *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

The regression coefficients in Table 1 indicate the effect of various independent variables on the number of feminist protest events. The analysis suggests that female labor force participation and the percentage of the vote for a woman president are positively associated with protest activity. The number of feminist protest events itself also has a positive effect on subsequent protest events.

Exploratory analysis found some initial support for the organization dynamic model. There is a significant .72 zero-order correlation between the density of Black organizations and the number of feminist protest events, and a .69 association with the number of women’s organizations founded. However, the correlations between number of Black protest events and number of feminist protest events or organizational foundings are not significant (results available from author).

Model 1, the baseline model in Table 1, specifies the influence of (lagged) number of feminist protest events and feminist organizational density on subsequent feminist protest events, controlling for demographic changes, political opportunities, and resources. There is a significant positive effect of the number of prior protest events on subsequent protest events, as expected from the protest dynamic model. There is, however, a significant inverse association between women’s organizational density and number of feminist protests. (A curvilinear specification of the organizational density variable was also examined, but it was not significant.) This suggests a trade-off between protest events and organization-building—investing in new organizations may direct resources away from protest (Piven and Cloward 1977).

Model 1 in Table 1 controls for lagged rates of female labor force participation, favorable public opinion towards women,
Democratic Party control of Congress, potential funding availability, and passage of laws favoring women. As expected, as women entered the labor market they developed a feminist consciousness and protested gender inequality (Klein 1985). Public opinion in support of women's gains also increases women's protest activity. However, during times associated with a more open political climate (measured by Democratic Party advantage) there is a lower likelihood that women will engage in protest. At such times, traditional modes of reform may seem more tenable, lowering women's willingness to engage in riskier direct actions.

Model 2 in Table 1 adds the number of Black protest events to Model 1; Model 3 adds Black organizational density to the baseline model. These models examine each variable's direct effect and its influence on the control variables. Model 4 (the full model) of Table 1 controls for number of Black protest events and Black organizational density simultaneously. Results for Model 4 show that the (lagged) number of Black protest events had a significant influence on the number of feminist protest events. Rather than promoting the intermovement diffusion of protest in a straightforward manner as Tarrow (1994) argues, increases in Black protest events apparently dampened feminist protest events—except when periods of heightened activism coincided with openings in the political opportunity structure. This interpretation is based on the significant interaction effect between the number of Black protest events and Democratic Party advantage in Congress that positively affects the number of feminist protest events. The negative signs for the number of Black protest events and Democratic Party advantage in Model 4 indicate that each variable has a negative effect when the other variable equals 0. When the number of Black protest events approaches 0, political control by allies channels support away from women's protest activity; when the political balance of power does not favor the movement, the number of Black protest events decreases the number of feminist protest events. Thus, high numbers of Black protest events and a Democratic Party advantage in Congress are necessary for protest to diffuse from the civil rights movement to the feminist movement.

In addition to the observed protest effect, an organizational dynamic is clearly significant in the diffusion of activism between the civil rights movement and the feminist movement. Increased density of African-American organizations promoted women's activism: Each addition to the number of Black organizations multiplies the number of women's protest events by close to 3 percent (compared to a less than .05 percent increase from Black protest events during periods of Democratic Party strength, and a 1-percent decrease at other times). I also tested curvilinear specifications of the Black protest events and density variables, but adding a quadratic term did not improve the fit of the model. There were no other significant interactions between number of protest events, organizational density, and the political environment.

Without qualification, increased density of organizations in the civil rights movement provided an opportunity for women's protest that was independent of political conditions, protest effects, and the interaction of the two. The density-dependence hypothesis is supported, but there is no evidence of a competitive turn around with respect to the influence of civil rights organizations on feminist protest. The protest dynamic hypothesis is also supported, with some modification to account for how the political context critically determines whether protest will diffuse from initiator to spin-off movements. In a supportive political environment, diffusion is more likely; at other times, protest by early risers may depress the protest activities of other constituencies.

Table 2 presents models predicting the number of women's organizations founded at the national level. Model 1 shows that, again, female labor force participation rates are positively correlated with the founding of new feminist organizations. However, there is a negative effect of periods of Democratic political advantage, which contradicts theoretical expectations. Also, as public opinion

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12 I also controlled for a time-trend variable (year) to examine whether these baseline variables mask a trend effect. The time-trend variable was not significant in any of the models.
Table 2. Poisson Coefficients from the Regressions of the Number of Feminist Organizations Founded on Selected Independent Variables: United States, 1955 to 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female labor force participation (t-1)</td>
<td>.334***</td>
<td>.339***</td>
<td>.243***</td>
<td>.248***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.039)</td>
<td>(.038)</td>
<td>(.054)</td>
<td>(.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent vote for woman President (t-1)</td>
<td>-.115***</td>
<td>-.106***</td>
<td>-.112***</td>
<td>-.105***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.027)</td>
<td>(.029)</td>
<td>(.024)</td>
<td>(.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party advantage in Congress</td>
<td>-.004*</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>-.044e-2</td>
<td>.005e-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(t-1)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.247e-2)</td>
<td>(.259e-2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation funding (t-1)</td>
<td>.301</td>
<td>.305</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.261)</td>
<td>(.260)</td>
<td>(.291)</td>
<td>(.292)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent laws passed favoring women</td>
<td>.120</td>
<td>.094</td>
<td>-.015</td>
<td>-.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.084)</td>
<td>(.089)</td>
<td>(.103)</td>
<td>(.105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of feminist protest events (t-2)</td>
<td>.566e-2</td>
<td>.654e-3</td>
<td>.494e-3</td>
<td>.561e-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.351e-3)</td>
<td>(.363e-3)</td>
<td>(.340e-3)</td>
<td>(.353e-3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density of feminist organizations (t-2)</td>
<td>.039***</td>
<td>.034***</td>
<td>.024*</td>
<td>.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.008)</td>
<td>(.010)</td>
<td>(.010)</td>
<td>(.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Density of feminist organizations)^2</td>
<td>-.014***</td>
<td>-.013***</td>
<td>-.010***</td>
<td>-.009**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Black protest events (t-2)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-.100e-2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-.076e-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.108e-2)</td>
<td>(.108e-2)</td>
<td>(.107e-2)</td>
<td>(.107e-2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density of Black organizations (t-2)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.020*</td>
<td>.019*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.009)</td>
<td>(.009)</td>
<td>(.009)</td>
<td>(.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.089</td>
<td>-2.163</td>
<td>-9.72</td>
<td>-1.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.570)</td>
<td>(1.566)</td>
<td>(1.298)</td>
<td>(1.311)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-62.7</td>
<td>-62.3</td>
<td>-6.4</td>
<td>-6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. "e-2"/"e-3" indicates that the regression coefficient or standard error should be multiplied times 10^-2/10^-3.

*p < .05      **p < .01      ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

becomes more favorable toward women, the founding rate declines—the obverse of the variable’s effect on women’s protest events. This suggests the importance of understanding protest events and group formation as distinct, although linked, processes. Neither foundation funding nor passage of favorable legislation appears to influence the founding process.

Increases in the (lagged) number of feminist protest events only approach significance (p < .10, two-tailed test), suggesting that feminist protest may promote the founding of feminist organizations. Increased density of feminist organizations significantly encourages further organization-building, although interorganization competition diminishes investment in organizations as density increases. Specifically, competition became determinant between 1971 and 1972, when the density of women’s organizations reached roughly 140.

Model 2 in Table 2 adds the number of Black protest events to Model 1; Model 3 adds Black organizational density to the baseline model; and Model 4 is the full model. The most visible manifestation of the civil rights movement—protest—has no discernible impact on the founding of women’s organizations, suggesting that the protest dynamic hypothesis cannot account for new group formation by spin-off movements. In contrast, the density of Black organizations significantly promoted the formation of new women’s organizations, without a significant competitive effect (the quadratic term is not significant). In support of the density-dependence hypothesis, growth of the civil rights sector aided the growth of the women’s
movement. The addition of one organization to the density of African-American organizations increased the number of new women's organizations by 2 percent. The most dramatic growth in Black organizational density occurred in the early 1970s, at the same time that women's organizational foundations increased as well (Figure 2).

To summarize, the development of civil rights organizations was a critical factor in women's group formation between 1955 and 1985, as was the growing density of women's organizations until the early 1970s. Earlier feminist protest events did not lead to any appreciable push for new organizational activity (although the high correlation between the number of feminist protest events and other independent variables may be masking the effect). The lack of observed influence of Black protest on women's group formation contradicts expectations derived from Tarrow (1991, 1994) and suggests that intensified civil rights protest activity did not provide an opening for women's organizing efforts. Although organizational density played a generative role, there was no significant interorganization competition between the two movements. Rather, the density of Black organizations provided a continuing opportunity for women to choose organization-building over protest. Paradoxically, over time this positive density-dependence across movements may have indirectly limited women's protest activity; the results in Table 1 demonstrate that the increased density of feminist organizations was correlated with a decline in the number of feminist protest events.

13 Women's labor force participation rates are highly correlated with several of the other independent variables in these models, especially vote for a woman president, the density of women's organizations, foundation funding, and the density of Black organizations. The correlation with number of feminist protest events is not as high, but is also significant (available from author). The inflation of the standard errors for the women's labor force participation variable as controls are added to the baseline model suggests that collinearity may be masking the significant effects of other variables in this model. The interpretation of the protest and density effects is unlikely to be altered, however. Even at the bivariate level, there is no significant association between the number of recent Black protest events and the number of feminist protest events.

The Competitive Sequencing of Protest

The civil rights movement had a clear impact on the development of the contemporary feminist movement. Did feminist's activism have a reciprocal influence on the trajectory of the civil rights movement? The relationship between early risers and entrants after the peak of the protest cycle is undertheorized. Presumably the entry of new groups into the social movement arena shifts the opportunities for ongoing protest and affects organizational mobilization for all groups. Regarding the decline of the protest cycle, Tarrow (1991, 1994) emphasizes competition among organizations and actors within initiator movements rather than competition between initiator movements and later movements. Koopmans' (1993) account of the radicalization and institutionalization of protest cycles is similarly limited. However, competition among early-riser SMOs may not be the only factor that precipitates a movement's decline. As more groups populate the social movement arena, competition—for resources, public support, and political inclusion—intensifies. Later entrants, piggybacking on the successful activism of early risers, "out-compete" them. There may be less space for multiple movements than is posited by the protest cycle model. Instead, a discrete sequencing of movements may occur such that one major movement dominates at any given time. Once feminist's protests and organizations became prominent, African Americans faced a more restricted social movement environment.

Figure 3 shows that during the early 1970s a significant overlap remained in civil rights and women's protest events and organizational foundations. Despite the decline in Black protest events by 1968, there was a substantial amount of action at the national level. The density of Black organizations began increasing in tandem with the increase in women's activism and organization formation. Some reciprocal influence of the women's movement on the civil rights movement therefore seems plausible.

Zero-order correlations suggest a significant inverse relationship between the number of feminist protest events and feminist organizational density and the number of Black protest events (r = .60 in each case). There is no
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black labor force participation (t−1)</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.011)</td>
<td>(.011)</td>
<td>(.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent vote for Black President (t−1)</td>
<td>.080***</td>
<td>.083***</td>
<td>.084***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.018)</td>
<td>(.020)</td>
<td>(.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Blacks in Congress (t−2)</td>
<td>−.161</td>
<td>−.159</td>
<td>−.214*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.088)</td>
<td>(.095)</td>
<td>(.090)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party advantage in Congress (t−1)</td>
<td>.007*</td>
<td>.007*</td>
<td>.008*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Black protest events (t−1)</td>
<td>.125e−2*</td>
<td>.128e−2*</td>
<td>.138e−2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.054e−2)</td>
<td>(.054e−2)</td>
<td>(.056e−2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density of Black organizations (t−2)</td>
<td>−.013</td>
<td>−.015</td>
<td>−.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.008)</td>
<td>(.011)</td>
<td>(.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of feminist protest events (t−2)</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>.099e−1</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.358e−1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density of feminist organizations (t−1)</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>.223e−2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.297e−2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>.135*</td>
<td>.134*</td>
<td>.134*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.056)</td>
<td>(.059)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.544</td>
<td>.468</td>
<td>.370</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.604)</td>
<td>(.641)</td>
<td>(.697)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>−158.3</td>
<td>−158.1</td>
<td>−157.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. "e−1"/"e−2" indicates that the regression coefficient or standard error should be multiplied times 10−1/10−2.

*p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

significant association, however, between Black protest events and the founding of national-level African-American organizations. These zero-order findings were confirmed using negative binomial regression (results available upon request). There may be a competitive replacement effect in which later entrants to the social movement arena displace early risers with respect to protest activity but not their organization-building.

Results from multivariate analyses of Black protest events and Black organizational foundings, however, showed no significant reciprocal effects between later entrants and early risers. Model 1 in Table 3 is the baseline model predicting the number of Black protest events. Model 1 suggests that a Democratic Party advantage, favorable public opinion toward Blacks, and (lagged) number of Black protest events significantly promoted subsequent Black protest events. The growing density of national Black organizations has a marginally significant negative effect on the number of Black protest events (p < .10, two-tailed test). (A curvilinear specification of the density effect did not improve the model’s fit.) Increases in Black Congressional representation—considered a measure of movement success—marginally decreases the number of protest events (p < .06). Each additional Congressional representative decreases Black protest events by 16 percent, suggesting that protest behavior is inversely related to movement gains. This is the kind of channelling activity that Jenkins and Ekert (1986) describe: Electoral advances make the environment less open to protest by constituencies that are gaining standing in the polity (also see Piven and Cloward 1977).

Models 2 and 3, which add controls for feminist protest events and feminist organizational density, do not improve the fit of the baseline model. Rather, the key factor driv-
ing the decline of Black protest events appears to be the success of the movement coupled with competition among civil rights groups. This fits McAdam’s (1982) description of the civil rights movement’s trajectory and confirms Tarrow’s (1994) suggestion that, at least within a given movement, inter-organizational competition replaces the protest demonstration effects. The fact that there is no effect of the feminist movement on the founding of civil rights organizations (results available upon request) also confirms that early risers establish a protected place in the social movement arena and face little competition from later entrants.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The development and decline of the 1960s U.S. protest cycle was contingent on both organizational and protest dynamics. Surges in protests by early risers generate activism by other constituencies. However, my analyses demonstrate that the diffusion of protest is situational: The recruitment of political allies and the expectation of elite responsiveness encourage protest by a range of groups and initiate the onset of a protest cycle. While Democrats had the political advantage for much of the period studied, periods of Republican dominance limited the diffusion of protest from the civil rights movement to the feminist movement.

In addition to political circumstances, an enduring organizational niche is essential for protest to spread beyond a single movement and to create protest opportunities for other challengers. Increases in organizational density encourage resource flows that can sustain ongoing activities even as political opportunities contract. An increase in movement organizations signals favorable political conditions to other constituencies and also provides resources for activism. In part, this process reflects the spread of information and political learning. The process also creates resources and institutional space for sustained protest and organization-building by a diversity of actors.

Direct and indirect mechanisms promote the organizational effects that I have documented. Activists become available for recruitment and mobilization; they can also cross movement boundaries, taking organizing templates with them (McAdam 1995). Resource-sharing and information-sharing are other direct ways that established organizations transmit advantages to new movements and their organizations (Walker 1983). Although the migration of activists, resources, and information between movement-related organizations is central, we also need to learn more about how affinities or differences in ideologies, strategic choices, or the resonance of organizational forms affect collaborative efforts (Clemens 1996). Activists must be able to adapt models of protest and organization to other movements.

Processes of legitimacy-building by initiator movements and how legitimacy is transferred to subsequent movements represent more indirect mechanisms by which organizational effects are transmitted. Organizational ecology models suggest that early investments in organization-building pay off, not only because resource flows become routinized and are available for use by other constituencies, but also because the successful maintenance and growth of organizations increases their acceptance by powerful third parties (Hannan and Carroll 1992). Such legitimacy affects the willingness of funders to support new constituencies, of authorities to tolerate their dissent, and of the media to broadcast their claims in a favorable light. Initiator movement organizations thus must alter the readiness of outsiders to support movement demands by establishing acceptance of the forms that their claims-making activities take. Organizational dynamics play a central role in the general legitimation processes, but few social movement researchers give them serious consideration (Clemens 1993; Minkoff 1994).

I also show that to understand protest cycles, the processes by which allies are placed in positions of power must be scrutinized. Allies represent access and political leverage, factors that are necessary for keeping the potential for protest open even as movements make policy gains. Without active and ongoing intervention by activists and their political sponsors, movement accomplishments (the passage of legislation, the election of representatives from the movement) are likely to close down protest opportunities for all groups even though such gains are usually partial at best (Piven and Cloward
1977). In fact, the growth of a national organizational infrastructure may encourage multimovement coalitions that can position supporters inside the political system thereby maintaining readiness for future protest.

There was less clear support for the view that the expansion of later movements contributes to intermovement competition and the decline of initiator movements. Later movements piggyback on the precedent-setting efforts of early risers without placing limits on them. Thus, early risers can establish and maintain a protected niche for their organizations even as more groups enter the social movement arena.

This analysis focused on the two most visible and enduring U.S. social movements of recent decades. However, the civil rights movement influenced a broad set of social movements, including the New Left and antiwar movements (Gitlin 1987), the peace movement (Meyer 1992), the ecology movement (Epstein 1991), the gay liberation movement (D’Emilio 1983), the Chicano movement (Omi and Winant 1994), and the political resurgence of the American Indian movement (Cornell 1988). Was there a similar interplay between protest and organization in the diffusion of activism to these movements? The analysis also leaves open the possibility that initiator movements are vulnerable to displacement by the new movements they engender.

A final research question is, how does the pattern of cross effects vary for movements that develop later in the protest cycle. What is the pattern of sequencing between the women’s movement and subsequent mobilizations, for example? Is diffusion similar to that between the civil rights movement and the feminist movement, or does the fact that later movements enter into a heavily populated niche change the intermovement dynamic? Some argue that density creates the possibility for new niches once competitive forces are released (Olzak 1992; Wilson 1973). Meyer and Whittier (1994) argue that the feminist movement influenced the form and development of the peace movement, but there may be competitive effects as well. Likewise, both mutualistic and competitive dynamics may have infused the relationship between the women’s movement and the pro-choice movement (Staggenborg 1991), the gay and lesbian movement (D’Emilio 1983), and the lesbian feminist mobilization (Whittier 1995). These movements have overlapping constituencies. They also developed in a more restricted political climate, suggesting that the presence of political allies may be less critical as the movement sector becomes more institutionalized.

The influence of organizational expansion on the diffusion of protest cycles across movements is understandable in the U.S. context. National social movement organizations have become increasingly important as vehicles for citizen participation in North American and Western European countries over the past century (Tarrow 1994; Tilly 1984). Nowhere are they more central to the operation of institutional life than in the contemporary United States. However, different state structures and political systems may produce distinctive patterns of interaction between organization and mobilization. Such variations will depend on the cultural and institutional support for, and restrictions on, different types of mobilizing structures (McCarthy 1996).

This analysis underscores the continued relevance of organizational analysis for the study of social movements. Both movement-based and organizational dynamics affect the development of national social movements. Spontaneous collective action builds on and offers an alternative for new organizational initiatives; the establishment and subsequent growth of a new niche for organizational activity encourages activism—both for early risers and so-called easy riders. Thus, the organizational system provides opportunities for the expansion of activism. The protest cycle initiated by the civil rights movement in the 1960s clearly shows that investments in organization were critical both early on and as the movement spread from a specific constituency to a wave of insurgency encompassing newly empowered citizens.

Debra C. Minkoff is Associate Professor of Sociology at Yale University. Her work explores the organizational dynamics of social movements, bringing macro-organizational theory to bear on questions of movement emergence and development. She is author of Organizing for Equality: The Evolution of Women’s and Racial-Ethnic Organizations, 1955–1985 (Rutgers University Press, 1995) and a number of articles exploring
the organizational dimensions of the civil rights and feminist movements. Her current research focuses on the structure and determinants of the national U.S. social movement sector.

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