liferation? Leitenberg and Zilinskas describe Soviet assistance to Iraq and Iran, but also assess that there was no significant post-Cold War emigration of scientists (partly thanks to Western assistance programmes), apart from a handful who went to Iran.

The Soviet biological-weapons complex was divided into two parts. The civilian part was where most of the research and development was conducted, notably at the massive Biopreparat complex. The military part was where the strains were weaponised. This ‘dark side’ of the programme remains closed to investigation. Leitenberg and Zilinskas believe that the offensive biological-weapons programme – the existence of which is still officially denied – never yielded any significant military benefit, and that, given its high cost, was a waste of money which siphoned resources from pharmaceutical and healthcare research. The famous warheads for ballistic missiles did not go beyond very early stages of development. But they also cautiously add that they ‘cannot assess the military accomplishments of the Soviet offensive BW program with any certainty’ (p. 705). They remind us that ‘transparency was never achieved. The Putin years have essentially been 10 years of hibernation as far as Russia and BWC compliance is concerned ... we do not know what is and has been taking place within the three [Ministry of Defense] facilities since 1992’ (p. 678). The fate of the second generation, post-1972 genetically engineered bacterial and viral strains remains unknown. The authors believe that they are probably stored in these facilities.

Finally, Leitenberg and Zilinskas confess that they still do not exactly understand why Moscow embarked on such a massive biological-weapons programme.

**Russia and Eurasia**
Angela Stent

**Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia**

NATO’s impending exit from Afghanistan has raised key questions about the future of Central Asia. Will the United States largely withdraw from the area? Will China or Russia determine its future? Can the states in the region cooperate enough to develop a viable strategy for their own future? Alexander Cooley,
a professor at Barnard College, challenges the conventional wisdom about the new ‘Great Game’ in this wide-ranging and compelling book.

Cooley examines the contest for influence in Central Asia between the United States, Russia and China since the 9/11 attacks. He advances three main arguments: that the security goals and strategic purposes of the three great powers have differed enough that all three countries have been able to pursue their interests without clashing; that America, Russia and China’s interactions in Central Asia have not been primarily about zero-sum competition, but have involved tactical partnerships; and that the Central Asian states, far from being passive pawns in this game, have been important actors in their own right. Indeed, ‘increased engagement with the United States, Russia and China in the 2000s clearly strengthened the capacity and authority of these regimes’ (p. 23). Central Asian leaders have leveraged their resources to ensure that the great powers have played by their local rules and enabled them to tighten their grip on power.

The central problem for the United States, writes Cooley, has been balancing the need to engage the governments of Central Asia on security issues and guarantee their support during Operation Enduring Freedom against encouraging them to make progress on corruption, democracy and human rights. Security considerations in the anti-terrorism campaign have taken priority over all other issues in dealing with the five Central Asian leaders.

Neither Russia nor China face such dilemmas, since they focus exclusively on security issues and access to Central Asia’s abundant energy resources. Russia, argues Cooley, ‘lacks a single overriding strategic goal’ in Central Asia (p. 51). It has created a series of multilateral organisations such as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation and the Customs Union to consolidate its influence in the region, but with limited results. Nevertheless, the large Central Asian migrant populations in Russia, whose remittances are vital for Central Asia’s economic growth, provide Moscow with its own sources of leverage.

But it is China, according to Cooley, that has proved itself ‘the most nuanced and skilled of the three great powers in regional diplomacy’ (p. 74). China dominates the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, using it to exert regional influence, and it has become the leading economic power in the region. While acknowledging Russia’s ‘sphere of privileged interests’ in Central Asia, China has signed energy deals with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan that will limit Russia’s access to their resources in the future. Under the guise of ‘strategic partnership’ with Russia in Central Asia, argues Cooley, China has quietly come out the winner.

Cooley advises the United States, which he views as a fading power, to remain open to flexible partnerships in this area and to return to its values agenda. That will prove to be a major challenge in post-Afghanistan Central Asia.